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WHAT IS A "QUESTION OF LAW"? 
ARTHUR W. PHELPS 
Professor of Jurisprudence, College of William and Mary 
The courts have for many years been developing and 
using a broad concept which at times has threatened to 
bring chaos rather than light to the solution of the legal 
problems it has affected. This concept enunciates the 
division between questions of law and questions of fact. 
It is broader than the question of the function of court 
and jury, for it has achieved significance in the determina-
tion of question of the scope of review which will be 
accorded by appellate courts in jury-waived cases, ad-
ministrative review, and substantively with respect to 
mistake, fraud, warranty and the like. 
It is immediately clear that a legal system . which 
postulates norms (roughly, rules and principles of law) 
must make some differentiation between a norm and the 
question of the existence of the facts which call for its 
application. If this view is accepted, rather than some 
anarchical conception of law derived from Justice 
Holmes' casual observation that law is what the courts 
do in fact, it is of importance to formulate some sort of 
category to indicate that the establishment of a claim 
involves the proof that certain facts exist, and to the 
contingency of their existence the state attaches the legal 
consequences now asserted by the claimant.1 
Newer schools of thought in jurisprudence when deal-
ing with the nature of law seem to place little emphasis 
upon the relative cohesion, symmetry, and predictability 
that a body of legal doctrine can acquire. The view of 
11 WIGMORR, EviDRNCR §I (2nd ed. 1923). 
25.9 
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such writers is valuable for the spotlight attention given 
to heretofore neglected psychological and a-logical features 
of the judicial process. However, since there is a negation 
of law in its accepted sense, their reasoning with respect 
to such problems as the difference between questions of 
law and questions of fact is of scant value to those 
thinkers who accept the premise that law has normative 
significance. • 
It is a part of the thesis of this article that the reason 
some influential writers see the distinction between 
questions of law and questions of fact as a difference in 
degree only is merely a reflection of their philosophy of 
law which treats the normative significance of law as of 
little moment and regards judging chiefly as administra-
tion or policy making according to vague principles of 
efficient dispatch of disputes which for the safety and 
good order of the state must be brought to rest. They 
recognize the importance of the settlement of disputes 
but regard the rule or theory upon which the settlement 
is to be made as relatively unimportant. 
Most writers on the subject after having made the 
primary distinction between questions of fact (that 
certain facts exist) and questions of law (to the con-
tingency of the existence of certain facts the state attaches 
legal consequences) are content to let the matter drop 
and to turn to the narrower phases of the subject, such 
as the question of the division of functions between judge 
and jury. Professor \Vigmore, before he leaves the diffi-
culties of the broader question, and settles to the com-
parative security of case distinction in the narrower field, 
suggests: 
"But the popular distinction between 'fact' and 'law' 
is here as accurate as the situation requires. The require-
ment is for phrases which shall set off in one class the 
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generality that the State sanctions and will habitually 
enforce a legal relation of a specific content, and in 
another class the specific occurrence constituting the 
contingency in which the State predicates this relation . 
. . . That many phenomena (events, or facts) may not at 
first sight be simple to classify, or easy to deal with, 
does not affect the reality of the distinction."2 
It is apparent from this statement that Professor 
Wigmore believes in the reality although perhaps not in 
the practicality of the distinction. Holdsworth, too, takes 
the same view, and then adds parenthetically: "This is 
not the place to attempt to map out minutely the de-
batable boundary line between law and fact." 3 
In opposition to this point of view, Professor Isaacs, 
after a careful survey of the various situations in which 
the chant "law and fact" has been used, comes to the 
conclusion that there is generically no difference between 
questions of law and questions of fact. 4 Professor Cook 
was, perhaps, the first to make this analysis, but his 
comments were restricted to the problem of the difference 
between conclusions of law and statements of ultimate 
fact in a pleading.5 Professor, now Judge, Charles E. 
Clark also takes the position that the difference between 
questions of fact and questions of law is one of degree. 6 
He seems to do so not so· much because of a clear recogni-
tion of the philosophy inherent in this view but because 
of his intense desire to accomplish the important ideal of 
trial on the merits. 
2Sttpra note I. · 
3 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 298 (3rd ed. 1922). 
'Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 CoL. L. REv. I, II (1922). 
•Cook, 'Facts' and 'Statements of Fact,' 4 U. OF CHI. L. R:sv. 233 ( 1937). 
6Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. OF CHI. L. R:sv. 190, 
211 (1937). 
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After stating that the distinction between fact and law 
is a primary one, none of the writers such as Wigmore 
and Holdsworth extends his observations to indicate why 
the distinction is basic, or why it has practicality. They 
seem agreed that where the problem is narrowed to a 
question of the division of functions between judge and 
jury, no aid is to be obtained by defining "law" and 
"fact," the inquiry being regarded in such case as one 
into the kinds of questions of fact which should be de-
termined by the judge. Where the problem is one of 
pleading, of scope of review, of administrative review or 
of mistake of law, it would also seem to follow from their 
discussions that defining the terms "law" and "fact" does 
not afford a satisfactory solution for any case.7 Now if 
the distinction is primary, as has been asserted, yet of 
limited significance in the solution of legal problems per 
se, for what purpose is the doctrine maintained? The 
utility of the concept must lie not in its immediate "case-
deciding" quality at all, but in the fact that the power 
resting in the court to classify a question as a question 
of fact permits a wider range of final decision by the 
court according to the needs of the case than would be 
true without its use. The actual decision of a case could 
not, therefore, be turned on the differentiation by defini-
tion of law from fact, but the concept would have mean-
ing as a classification of the situations in which the court 
may find it necessary to vary the norm, ordinarily ap-
plicable, usually by making it more specific, to meet the 
needs of a particular case. 
In the typical case a general standard applied by a 
trial court (either in a jury or a jury-waived case) is 
considered by the appe11ate court' to require more specific 
7j WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2549 (2nd ed. 1923); THAYER, A PREI.ImNAR\" 
TREATISE ON EviDENcE 185 ( 1898). 
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exposition for the situation at hand than it has received. 
The division between law and fact in its broad categorical 
sense has been drawn by the trial court, but merely 
drawn on the basis of a broader principle of law than 
seems satisfactory to the appellate court. Always, how-
ever, is present the norm on the one hand, and the fact 
on the other even though the norm may be less definite 
where it is a broad principle of law. 
If, then, the difficulty of separating functions of court 
and jury, determining scope of review in jury-waived 
cases and cases on administrative review, and determin-
ing the difference between mistakes of law and mistakes 
of fact, is recognized as arising not out of the distinction 
between law and fact, but out of the distinction between 
"standard" 8 which gives the courts, both trial and 
appellate, very wide range in deciding and reviewing 
cases, and "rule" the unreliable and misleading attempts 
to think of each of these problems as depending on the 
difference by definition between law and fact, with its 
confusing consequences would be obviated. But more 
important such analysis exposes for dear examination the 
nihilistic philosophy inherent in considering the difference 
merely one of degree. 
In order to furnish the basis for this thesis, it will be 
necessary to discuss the chief points at which confusion 
seems to arise in the decision of cases because of the 
persistent application by the courts of the law-fact 
fonnula. 
Statutes in many jurisdictions provide that pleadings 
shall state the ultimate facts as distinguished from con-
clusions of law. The language of special verdicts or 
8POUND, Hierarachy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 
TuLANS L. Rsv. 475 (1933); HALL, R~tADINGs IN }uRISPRuosNcs 661 (1938). 
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special findings by courts is subject to the same limita-
tion. In order to decide what is meant by such pro-
visions, it is necessary to determine exactly what is meant 
by law and what is meant by fact in such context. Several 
writers have advanced solutions for this riddle. Probably 
the most widely quoted is that of Professor Cook who 
says, "the time-honored distinction between statements 
of fact and conclusions of law is merely one of degree." 9 
In building up to this conclusion Professor Cook con-
cedes there is an external world of fact upon which he 
can bruise his shins. But when one starts to talk about 
this world of fact, he does not believe the events can be 
described as they "actually exist or occur." A pleader, 
for instance, will necessarily select from the "crude, raw 
events" the aspects of a situation which he as a pleader 
deems relevant and of importance in informing the court 
and the other party of the grounds upon which he desires 
the court to act in his favor. After selecting the relevant 
facts the pleader will have to express them under certain 
verbal symbols. Since the pleader is a lawyer he will 
select verbal symbols which have acquired a certain 
technical meaning for lawyers. When such verbal symbols 
having a technical meaning are used to describe the facts, 
a large part of the "concrete particularity" of a situation 
as it occurred will be left out. Professor Cook says that 
any statement would leave out some of this concrete 
particularity, therefore,. as to the sufficiency of a pleading, 
it is only a question of whether so much has been left 
out that the court and the opposite party are not fairly 
apprised of what the plaintiff expects to rely upon. 
Professor Gavit, on the other hand, concludes that the 
prohibition against the use of conclusions of law in a 
'Supra note 5 at p. 244. 
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pleading is against the use of language in its legal sig-
nificance as opposed to a use of language in its factual 
significance.10 He considers the requirement of pleading 
ultimate facts is one to insure that the pleader, if he has 
a choice of language (since sometimes words with both 
legal and common currency have to be used because 
there are no other which adequately express the idea) 
must choose and use ''the most compact and concise 
common language available." The difficulties of a pleader 
would therefore be verbal, and would be solved by the 
use of the proper language. 
A conclusion of law under Professor Cook's analysis 
would differ from a statement of fact only in so far as it 
constituted too general a description of the facts of the 
case, while under Professor Gavit's analysis a conclusion 
of law would consist chiefly in the use of a legal word or 
words when a common word or words should have been 
used. 
It is obvious that Professor Cook is not talking about 
"law" in a normative sense. He is merely saying that 
operative facts can be stated so generally that they be-
come indefinite as an aid to the court and opposite party 
in reaching an issue in a case. If the world "law" as 
used in the phrase "conclusions of law" does not denote 
the concept of "law" as a norm, but merely one aspect 
of law as a norm, how can it be said that Professor 
Cook's analysis really sets off "law" against "fact" in a 
sufficient sense that he can arrive at any conclusions as 
to the difference between "law" and "fact"-yet he 
apparently considers law and conclusions of law synony-
mous terms. 
10Gavit, Legal Conclusions, 9 IND. L. R~tv. 109 (1933). 
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Suppose, for instance, the allegation is that a defendant 
is "indebted to" a plaintiff, or that a statute is "uncon-
stitutional and void," or that a treasurer had paid out 
money "unlawfully." These statements barely suggest 
norms and would not provide the concreteness necessary 
for administrative (procedural) purposes in the cases to 
which they relate. They contain at most a composite 
statement (indicating vaguely a whole group of generic 
operative facts) which is related by the pleader to a 
particular result. Since the facts are so vaguely stated, 
a conclusion of law is really little more than a statement 
of the result the pleader wants the court .to reach. Modern 
pleading frequently accepts such '.'conclusions of law" 
because they postpone decision on the applicable rule of 
law until a full factual disclosure of the occurrence or 
event which is the basis of the action. 
Professor Charles E. Clark in his book on code pleading 
accepts Professor Co-:1k's view of the difference between 
conclusions of law and ultimate fact.U Considering a 
"conclusion of law" as an ill-expressed operative fact, it 
may well be that the difference is one of degree. It would 
be the difference between expressing an operative fact in 
one way and expressing it in another. Professor Clark, 
however, in a recent article, without any exegesis what-
soever, considers the solution of the pleading problem of 
the difference between statements of ultimate fact and 
conclusions of law ·a.s a solution of most of the law-fact 
problem.12 Neither Professor Clark nor any of the other 
writers making this prestidigitatorial transition gives 
a sufficient basis for belief that this is the case. There 
has, nevertheless, developed a widespread belief that the 
11 CLARK, ConE PLEADING 155 (1928); 231 (1947 ed.). 
12Supra note 6. 
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problem of distinguishing law and fact is, in all or most 
of its ramifications, a question of degree. 
As has been shown, however, Professor Cook, whose 
work is the basis for these later discussions, actually has 
made no comparison between law and fact. It is, there-
fore, misleading to use the arguments he has advanced 
in connection with the pleading problem as determinative 
of the law-fact problem in general where the distinction · 
attempted to be made is not between two types of state-
ments of operative facts, but an asserted difference be-
tween law in the sense of norm, and fact. Such a dif-
ference has been and is recognized by the courts where a 
distinction is made between the functions of court and 
jury, cases involving the scope of review, cases in which 
a distinction is drawn between mistake of law and mis-
take of fact, etc. 
In early days before civilization had developed much 
beyond the stage of a peaceable ordering of society, there 
was little difficulty with rules of law. The substantive 
as well as the adjective law consisted of the rules which 
governed the jurisdiction and procedure of the courts. In 
these primitive times the decision of a case upon the facts 
according to some standard was impossible because 
society had not developed the cohesion or the mechanics 
necessary to accomplish this. It was not until the thir-
teenth century that even so fundamental a conception 
as that of burden of proof began to take shape. The jury 
evolved under the lingering influences of the secta, trial 
by battle, ordeal, and compurgation. There was a ten-
dency at first to treat the jury as a formal proof sub-
stituted for these earlier modes of trial. The jury, as a 
body of witnesses, was the formal test to which the 
parties had submitted themselves, and a right judgment 
would be reached in a battle for instance, because the 
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process was directed by divine intercession. No one 
considered asking how the test worked, for its mysteries 
were not subject to th(~ scrutiny of men. Records at this 
time, therefore, indicate very little concerning rules of 
evidence, or instructions given to juries.13 
Gradually, around the seventeenth century, with the 
transition in the status of jurors from that of witnesses 
to that of judges of the facts, the maxim took shape that 
the jury were to judge of the fact in the case and the 
judge of the law. Strictly construed, of course, the 
maxim was not accurate, for incidental questions of fact 
which are not a part of the issue of a case have always 
been decided by the judge. Restricted to the question 
actually at issue between the parties, and not extended 
to fields where it has no application-such as incidental 
matters arising before and during the trial-there is a 
broad descriptive sense in which it may be said that there 
is a separation of function between the duty of the court 
with respect to the norm which is to be applied in the 
case and the duty of the jury with respect to the dis-
covery of the existence or nonexistence of the particular 
event in question. 
This indicates exactly at what point the task of allocat-
ing duties between court and jury becomes confused. It 
is not due to a misunderstanding of the distinction be-
tvreen law and fact but to a difference of opinion between 
the trial and the appellate court over whether a "stan-
dard" or a "rule" is more properly applicable to the 
case. This difference of opinion may be expressed with 
reference to the instruction of the court or to the question 
of whether there should be a directed verdict or the 
verdict should be set aside. If the trial court applied a 
tasupra note .1, p. 298 et seq. 
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broad "standard" in its instructions to the jury the 
appellate court can, if dissatisfied with the findings of 
the jury, reverse the case on the ground that the instruc-
tion did not state a definite rule of law. Or the appellate 
court may hold that under the facts the trial court was 
required to direct a verdict. In either case the argument 
would be that the jury was allowed to pass . upon a 
question of law which should have been made articulate 
by the court. 
If the norm applied by the trial court is a narrow one 
instead of a broad one, the appellate court can reverse 
the law-fact formula and say that the "rule" applied by 
the trial court was too narrow, that is, that the trial 
court passed on a question of fact. In both cases it is a 
false notion to think of the court as passing or failing to 
pass upon a question of fact. The trial court merely 
applied a different type of norm to the case than the 
appellate court thinks properly applicable. A "standard" 
was applied instead of the more definite "rule," or a 
"rule" was applied instead of a "standard." This prob-
lem is discussed and illustrated in a previous article. 14 
Professor Thayer, and other writers, 15 seem to feel that 
the transfer which takes place where a broad principle is 
replaced by a narrower one is a transfer which turns 
what was fact (since the case by gratuitous assumption 
would be subject to wide difference in result according 
14Phelps, Appellate Court Articulation of General Standards of Conduct, 
8 OHIO ST. L. ]. !73 (!942). 
16THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EviDENCE 207 (1898). Speaking of 
the action of judges Professor Thayer says: "In exercise of never-questioned 
jurisdiction of declaring common law ... there has arisen constant occasion 
for specifying the reach of definite legal rules, and so of covering more and 
more the domain of hitherto unregulated fact." This would be more accurate 
according to the thesis of this paper if he had said "hitherto broadly regulated 
fact" instead of "unregulated." Also see HoLMES, THE CoMMON LAW 110-
114 (1881). 
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to the temperament of different juries) into something 
new which will be called law. This seems erroneous. 
Fact in such case does not become law. Dean Pound's 
"rule'' merely replaees the "standard"16 which was 
formerly applicable, thereby theoretically making the 
proper result under the law more explicit and meaningful 
to the jury. The change which has taken place is a 
change in the rule of law which is applicable to the 
situation-by making it more explicit-not a change 
whereby anything which the jury decided as fact becomes 
by some sleight-of-hand law. 
Professor Bohlen thinks the jury has an additional 
duty besides that of fact finding where a broad standard 
is used by the court.17 He calls this an administrative 
function, and says the jury is neither declaring the law 
nor finding a fact when it is exercising this function. 
This is a strange additional classification which is of 
doubtful value. 
In order to help relieve the congestion in courts today 
there must be a return of faith in the reliability of general 
standards and in the approximation of justice which can 
be obtained by their use. Otherwise court dockets must 
remain clogged with cases in which courts are trying in 
every conceivable fact situation to indicate specifically by 
"rule" what the more general policies of the law demand 
in the particular case. The courts must have faith in the 
general standard where it is adaptable to the problem 
to be solved (i.e., perhaps, where ethical considerations 
are large factors),18 where the possible situations and 
modifications thereof are numerous, and where the de-
velopment of a vast body of detailed law will but neces-
18Supra note 8. 
17BoHLUN, STUDlUS IN THU LAw OF ToRTS 601 (1926). 
usupra note 8. 
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sitate distinction upon distinction until the reliability of 
such narrow rules as just-result-producing is poor, and 
their predictability nil. It must be remembered that 
where narrow ru1es are used in cases lending themselves 
fairly well to general standards, for the element of jury 
unreliability will be substituted the element of court 
unreliability. This merits more careful consideration by 
the courts than it has received. 
To illustrate the point some cases defining and refining 
a broad statutory standard set up within recent years 
are informative. The fact that it is a standard, much 
like negligence, and that it will illustrate what modem 
courts are doing with such standards, makes it a par-
ticularly interesting body of legal material from which 
to draw conclusions concerning the actual working of 
the judicial process in this connection. The cases are 
those involving the question of wanton misconduct under 
statutes which relieve the driver of an automobile from 
liability to his guest unless the driver is guilty of wilful 
or wanton misconductY 
Instead of being satisfied with one or two cases in the 
court of last resort of a state, setting up some proper 
general limitations to the doctrine of what constitutes 
wanton misconduct, such as "a reckless disregard of the 
safety of others," or "To constitute wantonness there 
must be actual knowledge, or that which in the law is 
esteemed to be the equivalence of actual knowledge, of 
the peril to be apprehended from the failure to act, 
coupled with a conscious failure to act to the end of 
averting injury," an unending multitude of cases draw-
ing fine distinctions of law concerning what under 
19Notes: 74 A. L. R. 1198 (1931); 86 A. L. R. 1145 (1933}; 96 A. L. R. 1479 
(1935}. 
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specific sets of facts should be said to constitute wanton 
misconduct have found their way to the highest court. 
Cases involving speed under varying situations are 
without number. A few of the combinations actually 
passed on by appellate courts follow: mere speed, extreme 
speed, speed plus remonstrances by the guest, speed plus 
drinking, speed plus drinking plus remonstrances, speed 
plus remonstrances plus ice, speed plus a foggy night, 
speed plus racing a train plus remonstrances, speed plus 
driving on the wrong side of the road, speed plus driving 
on the wrong side of the road in the face of an approach-
ing car, speed plus entering a blind intersection. It is 
easy to see that these are but a few of the combinations 
of speed plus other factors. Many more have been decided 
and are being decided every day. Each case only opens 
the door wider for another case, and usually imperatively 
demands another case. Jt is true that a few of the de-
cisions merely insist upon leaving the question to the 
jury, but this only after an elaborate opinion exhausting 
the court's views on specific fact situations. The majority 
of appellate courts, however, cannot avoid the tempta-
tion of saying, "This does not constitute wantonness as 
a matter of law," or "The facts clearly show wantonness 
in this case." Aside from the burden such cases place 
upon the courts, where they develop narrow rules, an 
examination of the decisions in one jurisdiction, and a 
comparison of cases in different jurisdictions, show 
rather conclusively that little predictability of law is 
achieved by this laborious process. 20 
2°Supra note 3 at p. 347 et seq. It is interesting to notice in this connection 
Holdsworth's remarks concerning the judge as a trier of fact. "tf a clever 
man is left to decide by himself disputed questions of fact he is usually not 
content simply to decide each case as it arises. He. constructs theories for 
the decision of analogous cases. These theories are discussed, doubted or 
developed by other clever men when such cases come before them. The 
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Why should appellate courts clutter their dockets with 
cases restricting general standards, where the predict-
ability of the law for a particular case and the predict-
ability of result in a particular case is not thereby en-
hanced? This question might be asked with especial 
reference to questions arising under statutes specifically 
setting forth general standards. 21 It will be. seen later 
that much of the difficulty involved in administrative 
review is caused by the desire of the court to insist upon 
specific standards of conduct in situations which are 
better cared for by general standards of conduct. The 
only conclusion one can make is that the courts have 
failed to appreciate the normative significance of general 
principles of law, and their fine adaptability to express 
the general social consciousness of what ought to be the 
case in a situation where "individualization of applica-
tion" is a dominant consideration. 22 Perhaps the result 
where a broad standard is applied is to some extent 
intuitively reached, but the appellate court may be 
counted upon for a substream of reasonably broad limit-
ing rules which will insure justice yet retain the flexibility 
of the broad standard. 
interest is likely to center, not in the dry task of deciding the case before the 
court, but rather in the construction of new theories, the reconciliation of 
conflicting cases, the demolition or criticism of older views. The result is 
a series of carefully constructed, and periodically considered rules, which 
merely retard the attainment of a conclusion without assisting in its forma-
tion." 
"Mr. Justice Frankfurter states in Wilkeson v. McCarthy, 69 Sup. Ct. 
4 J.), 420 ( 1948): "Despite the mounting burden of the court's business, this 
is the thirtieth occasion in which a petition for certiorari has been granted 
during the past decade to review a judgment denying recovery under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act in a case turning solely on jury issues." 
22Supra note 21 at p. 421 Mr. Justice Douglas states: "In the second place, 
doubtful questions of fact were taken from the jury and resolved by the courts 
in favor of the employer ... and so it was that a goodly portion of the relief 
which Congress had provided employees was withheld from them." 
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The Supreme Court of the United States in 1927 held 
that a person who failed to stop, to get out of his vehicle, 
and to look up and down a railroad track at a blind cross-
ing was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. 23 The 
Court said: "But we are dealing with a standard of con-
duct, and when the standard is clear it should be laid 
down once for all by the Courts." 24 Justice Holmes 
V\Tote the opinion, and it is consistent with his theory of 
the proper function o:f the court in dealing with general 
standards. 25 
It was improbable that such a rule should continue in 
effect very long, and in 1934, after Justice Holmes had 
retired from the bench, the Supreme Court "limited" the 
Goodman case. 26 The Court held that a standard of 
prudent conduct declared by courts as a rule of law must 
be taken over from the facts of life and must be such 
that a failure to conform to it is negligence so obvious 
and certain that rational and candid minds could not 
deem it otherwise. 
While Professor Bohlen tends to agree with the view 
that in general the courts properly should assume the 
function of fixing definite rules, he points out two dangers: 
one, that of undue rigidity of the standard (in spite of 
new inventions, new modes of living, and complete 
revaluation of the respective interests concerned); the 
other, that it enables unscrupulous practitioners to fix 
their witnesses by coaching them exactly what to say 
23Baltimorc & 0. R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24 (1927). 
2•Supra note 23 at 70 and 25. 
2•HoLMEs. THE CoMMON LAW 110 (1881): "It is equally clear that the 
featureless generality, that the defendant was bound to use such care as a 
prudent man would do under the circumstances, ought to be cuntinually 
giving place to the specific Ollc, that he was bound to use this or that pre-
caution under these or those circumstances." 
I&Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 98, 54 Sup. Ct. 580 (1934). 
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in order to meet the requirements of the law. 27 To these 
must be added the considerations here urged as para-
mount, namely, the unpredictability of the standard 
which results in costly litigation, and the cluttering of 
the court's docket. 
Justice Cardozo, who wrote the opinion in the Pokora 
case which overrules the Goodman case, neatly put his 
finger upon the difficulty with the rule in the Goodman 
case. He said: "The opinion in Goodman's case has been 
a source of confusion in the federal courts to the extent 
that it imposes a standard for application by the judge, and 
has had only wavering support by the courts of the states. 
We limit it accordingly." 28 The word "limit" was prob-
ably used ou.t of deference to Justice Holmes. These two 
cases, then, give us a striking illustration of the futility 
of specific standards of conduct where the jury or the 
fact-finding body can intelligently deal with the matter 
under a broad standard. 
The attitude of appellate courts with respect to general 
standards in cases tried to a jury also causes them to 
follow the same procedure where no jury is involved-
in reviewing cases tried by a court without a jury, and 
in reviewing the findings of administrative tribunals. 
There is a fear of misconstruction by the jury or the 
trial court or the administrative agency of some general 
principle (statutory or common law), perhaps, but added 
to this is the fact that the court wants, for one reason or 
another, to have a hand in the decision of the particular 
case. The law-fact formula gives them this opportunity. 
27Supra note 17: "On the whole, therefore, it may well be that the tendency 
of the courts to assume the function of fixing standards, whenever they feel 
that the jury will not give proper consideration to the social utility of the 
defendant's conduct, is necessary for the proper administration of the general 
principles by which a defendant's guilt or innocence should be determined." 
2ssupra note 26 at 102. 
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The present form of review for law cases in most states 
is restricted to a review of errors of "law." 29 For this 
reason. the distinction between law and fact must be 
maintained in form as well as in the thinking of the court. 
\Vhile the new rules of civil procedure for the federal 
courts now extend the scope of review of equity to jury-
waived cases,30 and it has been suggested that this has 
the effect of avoiding "the somewhat arbitrary distinc-
tion between law and facts," it is far from certain that 
this will be the result. 31 Modern equity review, while 
theoretically of the entire record on both law and facts, 
is not widely different from ordinary law. review because 
of the strong presumptions in favor of the findings of the 
court, and because of the equity requirement that the 
court separately state its facts and conclusions of law 
thereon. 
The distinction between law and fact must also be 
maintained where court review is had of administrative 
action. The ordinary rule, in the absence of statutes, and 
generally under prevailing statutes, is that the review by 
the court shall be limited to questions of law and that 
findings of fact by the commission, if supported by sub-
stantial evidence, shall be conclusive unless it shall 
appear that the findings of the commission are arbitrary 
or capricious.32 
29Supra note 6. 
ao3 OHLINGER, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 632; 3 ibid. 188, A Rule 52 (1948). 
31 Supra note 6 at p. 208. 
W'In the language of judicial review sharp differentiation is made between 
questions of law and questions of fact. The former, it is uniformly said, are 
~uhject to full review, hut the latter, in the absence of statutory direction to 
the co11trary, are not, except to the extent of ascertaining whether the ad-
ministratiYe !'i11ding is supported hy substantial evidence." Rep. Atty. Gen. 
Com . .-\d. Pr .. c. 88 (1941). 
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Both in his dissent in Crowell v. Benson33 and in the 
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 34 Justice 
Brandeis indicated his view that the findings of fact of 
a commission should be conclusive on the court. A 
reversal should take place, accordingly, only on an error 
of law or an arbitrary finding without evidence to supoprt 
it. The majority opinion in the St. Joseph Stock Yards 
Co. case, on the other hand, followed the formula of an 
equity appeal.36 They would permit a review of all the 
facts, in certain types of cases, subject to a certain 
weight to be given to the findings of the administrative 
tribunal. 
Professor Clark suggests that if we accept the formula 
of review which was originally advocated by Justice 
Brandeis in the St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. case and 
which case profoundly influenced the present Court, the 
review could be made as broad or as narrow as the Court 
chose to make it by calling what normally might be 
The statutes provide several variations which are probably more in terms 
of words used than in ascertainable difference of application. See: 2 Ohlinger 
Federal Practice 808 §2:1; 811 §2.2. 
"All of these clauses, irrespective of the words used, have been construed 
as embodying the substantial evidence· rule-which would presumably have 
been applied by the courts even if specific provisions therefor had been lack-
ing." Stern: Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A 
Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REv. 70, at 76 (1944). At page 75 foot-
note 21 the same author says, "There has been some justifiable criticism of 
the analysis by which the question of substantial evidence is described as 
one of law." 
It seems hard to improve on Professor Stason's suggestion that the test 
for substantial evidence should be, "whether on the evidence including in-
ferences therefrom a reasonable man acting reasonably might have reached 
the decision." Stason, Substantial Evidence in Administrative Law, 89 U. OF 
PA. L. REV. 1026, 1038, 1051 (1941). 
33Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 52 Sup. Ct. 585 (1932). 
34St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U.S., 298 U.S. 38, 56 Sup. Ct. 720 (1936). 
35ARNOLD AND }AMES, CASES ON TRIALS, jUDGMENTS AND APPEALS 833, 
footnote 50 (1936). 
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thought of as fact, 36 law. He formulates this from his 
conception of the difference between law and fact as one 
merely of degree. As has been indicated, however. this 
is not a solution of the law-fact problem and it tends to 
hide what the court is really doing under the law-fact 
formula. The reason that the court could assimilate a 
larger review to itself, if necessary, in administrative 
cases under the Brandeis formula is not because the 
difference between law and fact is a difference in degree, 
but because of the fact that in most important adminis-
trative cases on appeal the questions of law being reviewed 
are questions as to broad standards of conduct which 
may either be maintained as such, or given the concise-
ness thought by the courts necessary to their just-result-
producing effectiveness.37 It is to be hoped that the 
future will seal a better fate for the general standards of 
conduct necessary in administrative regulation than the 
fate of many broad common law and legislative standards 
which are today in need of rebirth as such for a new 
generation in which "conduct" problems are of para-
mount concern. 
In the field of substantive law a separation between 
mistakes of law and mistakes of fact did not take place 
until the nineteenth century.38 Before that time no 
distinction had been made between mistakes of fact and 
mistakes of law. It was in Bilbie v. Lumley,39 that Lord 
Ellen borough set forth a doctrine that ''every man must 
be taken to be cognizant of the law," and set the stage 
MSupra note 6, particularly footnote 93. 
37For a series of cases illustrating the problem in which a rather unsatis-
factory and confusing classification of the cases is attempted, see Brown, 
Fact and Law in Judicial Re-view, 56 HARV. L. R~tv. 899 (1943). 
asNote, 5 'l'. oF CHI. L. Rsv. 446, 447 (1938) and authorities there cited. 
392 East 469 ( 1802). 
WHAT IS A "QUESTION OF LAW"? 279 
for one of the most artificial and unjustifiable concepts 
ever to gain wide currency as a rule of law, namely, that 
money paid under a mistake of law could not be re-
covered. 
There is clear agreement among writers on the subject 
that relief should be given for mistakes of law as well as 
mistakes of fact, in proper cases.40 To make a differentia-
tion upon the basis of whether the mistake is one of law 
rather than one of fact appears improper not because it 
is not reasonably capable of ascertainment whether the 
mistake is one as to the norm or rule which would be 
applicable, but because there is no logical reason for a 
differentiation on the basis of law and fact. 41 A layman 
should not be expected to understand many difficult 
questions of law. He might also be as completely ignorant 
with respect to the matter in regard to which he contracts 
as he might be of the existence of any fact. To take a 
maxim said to be necessary to the criminal law (that 
everyone is supposed to know the law) and to plant it 
in an entirely different soil--contracts for instance-
seems to need more substantiation than can be found for 
it in ;:tny of the cases fostering the idea. 
Professor Isaacs seems to believe that the difficulty of 
drawing the line between the two types of questions IS 
•osupra note 38. 
t1WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS 12 (1913). At page 59: "Assuming then 
that it is not true that one is presumed to know the law, and further assuming 
that the danger of the abuse of the right is not a grave one, is there any other 
ground, any reason in justice or public policy, which justifies the rule of no 
recovery? It is believed that there is not. On the contrary, it is believed 
that to permit a recovery, with limitations the same or similar to those with 
which the right to recover in cases of mistake of fact is hedged about, would 
sensibly diminish the area of human rights at present beyond the reach of 
the law." 
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insurmountable.42 This is a part of his thesis that there 
really is no generic difference between questions of law 
and questions of fact. The distinctions which Professor 
Isaacs mentions as developed by the courts to escape the 
doctrine-i.e., ignorance of law, mistakes of public law 
and of private rights, mistakes in choice of terms and 
mistakes in substance, mistakes of law and mistakes as 
to the legal effect of a law-were developed to get around 
the whole unjustifiable theory that the courts would not 
relieve for mistakes of law, and were not developed be-
cause the courts could not distinguish norm from fact. 
Professor Isaacs recognizes this himself when he says, 
"It is true that courts have attempted to call all kinds 
of mistakes mistakes of fact rather than mistakes of law 
because of the palpable injustice of this rule. "43 
A "functional" use o:f the distinction between law and 
fact which is frequent in the courts-a use which all the 
writers mentioned have recognized as a futile one-is 
made either because the courts expect too much of the 
concept, because they do not understand its character, 
or because the courts want to reach a desired result and 
need a sufficiently meaningless ground upon which to do 
so-a ground which they believe will not commit them 
to too much in the future. All too frequently, as has been 
shown, courts unwittingly commit themselves to cluttered 
42Supra note 4 at I, footnote I: "Other discussions, in which the absence 
of a difference between the two types of questions is found to make the book-
rules utterly useless in the really difficult cases, are those connected with 
mistake of law and mistake of fact, and misrepresentations of law and mis-
representations of fact." 
•ssupra note 4 at 9 and 13: "In the law of mistake and representations 
(fraud and warranty) the undoubted tendency of the day to abolish the dis-
tinction between conclusions of law and propositions of fact is supported by 
the conclusion that we are not here dealing with a generic difference, but 
merely with a catalogue of qUE:stions placed in one column or the other on 
the basis of procedure." 
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dockets and to unpredictability of law. If the courts did 
not mumble "This is a question of law for the court," but 
frankly asked, "What type of principle broad or narrow 
is the best for the decision of this case?" a great advance 
would be made both in achieving justice in the particular 
case and in streamlining the law. 
To call the difference between questions of law and 
questions of fact a matter of degree is to give a false 
aspect to a primary and necessary "structural" division 
of law. In each case the broad separation of law from 
fact is not only possible but proper. If the court can see 
that the law-fact formula is not a reason for taking a case 
from a jury, reviewing a case, or deciding whether money 
paid under mistake is recoverable, etc., the court can 
make a careful examination in each controversy into the 
nature of the norm which it is advisable to promulgate 
or continue. 
The body of law which faces the modem law student 
is unrivaled in the history of the world from the stand-
point of its bulk and intricacy. Unquestionably the com-
plexity of modem life has been in part responsible for 
this fact, as has also the philosophy of the time which 
compels the regulation of a vast number of human 
activities. The only way out of this predicament seems 
to be by some process of simplification and classification 
of legal concepts. It may be well for sciences to develop 
discourses which are incomprehensible to any but the 
most astute, where significant values are thereby achieved, 
but law must. ever find its focal point at the level of the 
average man in every day life. This is certainly necessary 
in a democratic society, for the continuation of such a 
society depends upon the education of all in the processes 
of such a society. 
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The fundamental difficulty with a great many of our 
rules of law lies in the fact that they do not procure the 
certainty and precision of result their enunciation seems 
to assure. They are detailed, to be sure, and explicit, but 
the result of their application is not thereby foretold with 
accuracy. The average man can channel his conduct 
according to a general principle with fair accuracy and 
can be reasonably sure when he is skimming close to the 
line, but if it is necessary for him to master a set of details, 
especially a set of details which have warped or skewed 
the policy of the standard or crystallized it according to 
the dictates of a preceding era, then he finds himself 
unable to comprehend the standard to which he must 
conform. A substantial step will be taken in the direction 
of a simplification o:f law when the courts cease to 
rationalize decisions on the basis of the law-fact formula 
and find more defensible grounds for their action. 
